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Abstract
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this by giving agents incentives to link with others and receive information through those links.
We consider networks where agents have an incentive to confirm the information they receive
from others. Our paper analyzes the social networks that are formed. We first study the
existence of Nash equilibria and then characterize the set of strict Nash networks. Next, we
characterize the set of strictly efficient networks and discuss the relationship between strictly
efficient networks and strict Nash networks. Finally, we check the robustness of our results
by allowing for heterogeneity among agents, possibility of bilateral deviations of agents, and
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1 Introduction
Social networks are purveyors of information where its members use their direct and indirect
connections to obtain information from others. A very substantial literature covers different
aspects of this topic ranging from Granovetter [8], who studies transmission of information
about job opportunities to Bala and Goyal [1], who focus on learning from one’s neighbors, and
Goyal and Galeotti [6] who examine how information (modeled as a public good) is gathered
and shared within a network of individuals. In some situations the reliability of information
acquired through the network matters, creating a need for the confirmation of information.
This need can arise for several reasons, for instance agents might have issues with recall, or the
information may have a subjective component to it. Our paper addresses network formation
in this context − how does the need to confirm information obtained from an individual in the
network affects network formation?
The need for the confirmation of information is especially true in situations where such
information is used to make significant decisions. For instance, the Book of Deuteronomy
states that “On the testimony of two or three witnesses a man [who has done an evil deed]
shall be put to death, but no one shall be put to death on the testimony of only one witness”
(17:6). Such confirmation is a key part of our judicial system where it is often necessary to have
multiple witnesses who can corroborate a piece of evidence. In many instances, particularly if
the information is subjective, researchers also have a need for confirming information. When
writing a survey paper, one often reads the original source as well as other interpretations of
the same work to write a more scholarly piece. While attending a conference we often talk to
different researchers about the same paper to enhance our understanding of it. For the sake
of credibility journalists typically attempt to confirm information in several different ways. Of
course, government agencies also usually need to confirm information prior to acting on it.1
In this paper we model the desire for confirmation by allowing for the possibility of both
unconfirmed and confirmed information based on the cost agents wish to incur. Agents in
the model establish a network to acquire information by forming links with each other. Our
objective is to identify the architecture of stable networks using the concepts of (strict) Nash
1All these cases require corroboration of information, that is using additional information to validate already
obtained information. In other words, agents look for other information to support and reconconfirm (or to challenge
or rebut) information they have found. There is an extensive literature on this subject (see for instance Miranda,
Vercellesi and Bruno [16], and Jick [13]).
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network when agents make decisions based on the benefits and costs of links. We establish when
such equilibrium networks exist, and how they differ from efficient networks, i.e., networks that
maximize aggregate payoffs. Finally, we also consider some extensions of the original model
to check the robustness of our findings.
Formally, we consider a setting where each agent, modeled as a node in the network, is a
source of benefits of information that others can tap via the formation of costly links. Agents
do not falsely report their information,2 and we assume that a link with another agent allows
access to the benefits available to the latter through all her (direct and indirect) links. In
the model the costs of link formation are incurred only by the agent who sponsors the link,
and these links taken together define a social network. We assume that information obtained
through one path, or sequence of links, is said to be unconfirmed, while information that is
obtained through one other distinct path in the network is said to be confirmed.3 In our setting
confirmed information is worth more to an agent than unconfirmed information which requires
only one path and is therefore cheaper.4 Ex ante all agents are assumed to be identical in the
model. Consequently, the payoff obtained by each agent in a social network depends on (i) the
number of confirmed resources she obtains from other agents, (ii) the number of unconfirmed
resources she obtains from other agents, and (iii) the number of links she sponsors and so the
costs she incurs. Observe that our formulation introduces heterogeneity endogenously in the
model by allowing for the value of information to depend on the network structure.5
Our analysis of network formation in this model provides a number of interesting insights.
First, we show that Nash networks in pure strategies may not exist under a general payoff
function that incorporates the three elements mentioned above. However, we find that a Nash
network always exists if the function that captures the costs of sponsoring links is convex.
Second, we characterize strict Nash networks and interestingly find that strict Nash net-
2This assumption is standard in the network formation literature.
3We can assume that agent i obtain confirmed information from agent j when she is directly linked with j. This
does not affect our main results. We have chosen the current formulation.
4In computer science there is a also a body of literature that considers distinct paths in routing applications (see
for instance Lee and Gerla [15] and Tsirigos and Haas [17]). Although this phenomenon called multipath routing is
not used to confirm information, it increases the payoffs of players at higher costs by lowering delay, providing better
security or improving fault tolerance. Thus our formal model can also be used to study situations where there is an
explicit need for redundancy or alternate paths.
5The typical approach for introducing heterogeneity in the two-way flow model of Bala and Goyal has been
through different exogenously given values and costs of links. See for instance Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst [7],
and Billand, Bravard and Sarangi [5].
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works need not be connected despite the fact that all agents are identical. We show that
connected6 strict Nash networks have simple architectures: they are either minimally con-
firmed networks, or center sponsored stars.7 Then, we show that non-connected strict Nash
networks contain wheels8 and at most one subnetwork which is either empty, or minimally
confirmed. Strict Nash networks have two interesting properties. In a strict Nash network a
player cannot obtain both confirmed and unconfirmed resources; and there do not exist players
who obtain unconfirmed resources and players who obtain confirmed resources.9
Third, we study efficient networks. As is often the case with such models, it is difficult to
characterize efficient networks with a general payoff function; so we restrict attention to cases
where the payoff function is linear. We show that an efficient network is either a minimal
unconfirmed network, or a minimal network that is cyclic. The last three sections of the
paper are intended as a robustness check of our paper. In section 4, we assume agents are
heterogeneous in the way they value information. Some agents, say for instance journalists,
derive no utility from information that is not confirmed. We study how network formation is
affected by the introduction of such agents. In section 5, we examine situations where pair of
players can bilaterally deviate in order to make a Pareto improvement in their payoffs and we
use an equilibrium notion called bilaterally rational network. This serves as a robustness check
of the strict Nash networks concept which is the most commonly used equilibrium concept.
This refinement turns out to be interesting since it eliminates the earlier division of equilibrium
networks into connected and non-connected and also supports a new type of architecture as
an equilibrium network. Finally, in section 6, we briefly discuss the implications of a decay
assumption in our framework, which takes into account distance along the alternate paths.
Our paper is inspired by the Nash networks model of Bala and Goyal [2] and here we
expand the scope of the two-way flow version of their connections model (in the following we
refer to this model as the standard BG model). In Bala and Goyal’s model a set of agents
simultaneously decide who they wish to link with, which in turn determines the network
6A network is connected if there is a path between every pair of agents.
7A minimally confirmed network is a network where each player obtains confirmed resources from every other
player and if a link is removed from this network, then at least one player loses some confirmed resources. A center
sponsored star is a network where a player sponsors a link with each other player while other players do not sponsor
any links.
8In a wheel each player forms and receives one link.
9Though it is possible to have players who get no resources at all.
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structure.10 As in our model links are established as long as the agent initiating the link pays
for it. Moreover, each agent obtains the information of agents she is directly or indirectly
connected to; and agents do not report their information falsely. However, in the standard BG
model there is no added benefit of getting information confirmed; in our model there is. This
results in a very different set of equilibrium networks.
A number of variations of the standard BG model have also been developed in which there are
additional benefits from having different paths. However, all of these rely on link imperfections
of some type or the other. One of these considers the possibility that links can fail with an
exogenous probability. See for instance Bala and Goyal [3] who introduce the basic model and
Haller and Sarangi [9] who allow for exogenous heterogeneity in this model. Since links can fail,
the incentive for alternate paths in this model is a type of insurance against link failure that
provides an access to the same information. In another class of models introduced by Bala and
Goyal [2] and generalized by Hojman and Szeidl [10] the value of information acquired from
agents that are farther away in the network decreases in value.11 Under certain situations this
creates an incentive to establish an alternative path to an agent with whom a player is already
linked. Note that in decay models the loss of information through the network is “continuous”
with distance, while in our model the loss of information may be considered “discontinuous”.
The major difference between our model and decay models is that in these models the shortest
path acts as the purveyor of information, while in our model two distinct paths are crucial.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model setup. In section
3 we study Nash networks, strict Nash networks, and efficient networks. In section 4, we
assume that agents are heterogeneous with regard to the value they obtain from unconfirmed
information. In section 5, we allow the possibility for players to make some bilateral deviations.
In section 6 we discuss the role played by decay in a model with a confirmation assumption.
10Unlike the model of Jackson and Wolinsky [11], there are no consent issues here.
11Bala and Goyal [2] give a characterization of the equilibrium networks of diameters 2 and 3. This characterization
is extended to equilibrium networks of all diameters by De Jaegher and Kamphorst [12]. Billand, Bravard and Sarangi
[4] deal with the implications of exogenous heterogeneity in the presence of decay. Note that in models that allow
for link imperfections and exogenously given heterogeneity, in equilibrium the set of Nash networks is quite large.
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2 Model setup
Our model setup builds on the two-way flow connection model of Bala and Goyal [2].
Networks definitions. We begin by giving the formal definition of a directed network.
A network g is an ordered pair of disjoint sets (N,A) where A is a subset of the set N × N
of ordered pairs of N . The set N , with |N | ≥ 3, is the set of vertices which corresponds with
the players set and A = A(g) is the set of arcs which corresponds with the relations or links
between the players. We assume that there is no arc from a player i to herself. An ordered
pair (i, j) ∈ A(g) is said to be an arc directed from i to j and is denoted by ij. Here i is said
to be the sponsor of ij and j the recipient of ij. Let Ai(g) = {kj ∈ A(g) : k = i and j ∈ N}
be the set of arcs sponsored by player i in g and let A−i(g) = A(g) \ Ai(g) be the set of arcs
sponsored by players j 6= i in g. The set of arcs of g can be written as A(g) = Ai(g)∪A−i(g).
To simplify notation, we write Ai(g)∪ {i j} = Ai(g) + ij and Ai(g) \ {i j} = Ai(g)− i j. For
consistency, we write A(g)∪{ij} = A(g) + ij and A(g) \ {ij} = A(g)− i j. We denote by gij
the network (N,A(g) + ij), and by g−ij the network (N,A(g)− ij). We say that ij ∈ A(g) if
and only if ij ∈ A(g), or j i ∈ A(g). Let G be the set of directed networks with N as the set
of vertices.
Let Vi(A(g)) = {j ∈ N \ {i} : ij ∈ A(g)} be the set of players with whom player i is directly
linked in g. If |Vi(A(g))| ≥ 3, then i is called a key player in g.
For a directed network, g, an undirected path (u-path) between player i and player j, Pij(g),
is a sequence of players (i0, i1, . . ., iL) such that i0 = i and iL = j and i` i`+1 ∈ A(g), for
` ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1}. Two u-paths between i and j are disjoint if the only players they have in
common are i and j. The number of disjoint u-paths between i and j in g is the maximal num-
ber of disjoint u-paths between i and j in g.12 Let Ni(A(g)) be the set of players j ∈ N \ {i}
such that there is at least one u-path between i and j in g. In that case i and j are said to be
connected in g. For player i, we define the set of confirmed players as
NCi (A(g)) = {j ∈ N \{i} : There exist at least two disjoint u-paths between i and j in g}, 13
12In a network g, the number of disjoint u-paths between i and j can be different according to the u-paths chosen.
13It is worth noting that in a component which contains only two players, say i and j, these players cannot receive
confirmed resources from each other since there is only one u-path between them.
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and the unconfirmed players set of player i as
NUi (A(g)) = {j ∈ N \ (NCi (A(g)) ∪ {i}) : There exists one u-path between i and j in g}.
Obviously, j ∈ NCi (A(g)) implies i ∈ NCj (A(g)) and j ∈ NUi (A(g)) implies i ∈ NUj (A(g)).
There is an alternative way to model the confirmation of resources. We could assume that
player i receives confirmed resources from player j when she is directly linked with j in addition
to the case where there exist at least two disjoint u-paths between i and j. In other words, it
is not necessary for player i who directly obtains resources from j to confirm it: resources are
distorted because of the existence of intermediaries between players. It is worth noting that
our main results concerning equilibrium networks (Propositions 4 and 5) are not qualitatively
changed: we obtain the same architectures.14
A cycle consists of an u-path where there exists an arc between the terminal player and the
initial player on the u-path. A wheel is a cycle where each player sponsors only one arc and
receives only one arc.
A network g is connected if each player i ∈ N is connected with every other player j ∈ N \{i}.
A network g is minimally unconfirmed if it is connected, and for any arc ij ∈ A(g), the network
g−ij is not connected.15 A network g is confirmed, if for all players i ∈ N and j ∈ N \ {i},
there are at least two disjoint u-paths between i and j. A network g is minimally confirmed if
it is confirmed, and for any arc ij ∈ A(g), the network g−ij is not confirmed.16 A sub-network
of g = (N,A), say g|X , is a network where the set of vertices, X, is a subset of N and an arc
ij belongs to A(g|X ) if and only if ij belongs to A(g). A network g is a minimal cycle network
if it is minimally confirmed and contains n arcs. A maximal connected sub-network of g is a
component. Let W(g) be the set of players who belong to components that are wheels in g
and let g|N\W be the sub-network induced by the players in N \W(g) in g. It is obvious that
if a component of g, g|W , is a wheel of g, then we have W (g) ⊂ W(g). A star is a network
where a player, say i, is involved in an arc with all the other players while the other players
14Sketch of Proofs of this statement are given in Appendix E. Note that in the alternative way to model the
confirmation of resources, we have:
NCi (A(g)) = {j ∈ N \ {i} : j ∈ Vj(g) or there exist at least two disjoint u-paths between i and j in g}.
15In graph theory, a minimally unconfirmed network is a 1-arc-connected network and they are called trees. Bala
and Goyal [2] called these networks minimally tw-connected networks.
16In graph theory, a minimally confirmed network is a 2-arc-connected network.
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are involved only in the arc with i. If i sponsors all the arcs in the star, then the network
is a center sponsored star; if i sponsors no arcs in the star, then the network is a periphery
sponsored star. These architectures and a minimal cycle network are shown in Figure 1.
A network g is a base network if there does not exist a network g′ such that
1. NCi (g
′) = NCi (g), N
U
i (g
′) = NUi (g), for all players i ∈ N ;
2. There exists a player i such that |Ai(g′)| < |Ai(g)| and for all players j ∈ N \ {i},
Aj(g
′) = Aj(g).
A network g is a minimal base network if there does not exist a base network g′ such that
1. NCi (g
′) = NCi (g), N
U
i (g
′) = NUi (g), for all players i ∈ N ;
2. |A(g′)| < |A(g)|.
A bipartite network is a network whose vertices can be divided into two disjoint sets X1 and
X2 such that every arc connects a vertex in X1 to one in X2. A complete bipartite network
is a bipartite network where there exists an arc between each vertex in X1 and each vertex in
X2. Finally, a player who sponsors and receives no arcs is called isolated player.
We now illustrate some network architectures. In Figure 2, network g1 is not a base
Minimal cycle network Center sponsored star Periphery sponsored star
Figure 1: Networks architectures
7
1 2 3
4 5 6
7
1 2 3
4 5 6
7
1 2 3
4 5 6
g1 g2 g3
Figure 2: Base and minimal base networks
network since the arc 5 4 is not needed. Network g2 is a base network and g3 is a minimal
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base network.
Strategies of players. In this paper, we only use pure strategies. Let Gi = {ij : j ∈ N \{i}}
be the set of arcs that player i can form with other players. In our context, each player i ∈ N
chooses a strategy which consists in forming arcs: Ai ∈ 2Gi . It is worth noting that the set
of arcs between distinct players of network g is A(g) =
⋃
i∈N Ai(g). Given a network g ∈ G,
A−i(g) =
⋃
j∈N\{i}Aj(g) denotes the strategy profile played by all players except i.
Payoffs. To complete the definition of the normal-form game of network formation, we now
specify the payoffs. When two players are connected, they gain access to each other’s informa-
tion. However, due to the characteristics of the network, information owned by each player is
distorted. We assume that if two players are connected via at least two disjoint u-paths, they
access each other’s information and this information is more valuable. This is called confirmed
access or confirmed connection. Conversely, if they are not connected via at least two disjoint
u-paths, the information received is imprecise, and this reduces the value of the information.
We call this unconfirmed access or unconfirmed connection. We assume that each player i
prefers to obtain confirmed information instead of unconfirmed information.
An equivalent confirmation set (ECS) is a set of players who obtain confirmed information
from every other player of this set. A maximal equivalent confirmation set (MECS) is a ECS
which is not a subset of another ECS. Formally, we define the set of equivalent confirmation
sets as follows: E(g) = {X ⊂ N : i ∈ X, j ∈ X ⇒ j ∈ NCi (g)}. Likewise, the set of maximal
equivalent confirmation sets is: EM (g) = {X ∈ E(g) : there is no X ′ ∈ E(g), X ⊂ X ′}. Let
M(g) = {j ∈ N : j ∈ X ∩X ′ with X,X ′ ∈ EM (g)} be the set of players who belong simul-
taneously to several MECS. We illustrate the construction of these sets through the following
example.
Example 1 In network g drawn in Figure 3, we have EM (g) = {A,B,C,D,E}, M(g) =
{1, 3, 5, 6}.
Finally, we assume that each arc is costly to form for its initiator. We now formally define
the payoff function of each player i. Let f1, f2, f3 be strictly increasing functions, with
fk(0) = 0 for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
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Figure 3: Maximal equivalent confirmation sets
The payoff function of each player i, given a network g, is:
pii(A(g)) = f1(|NCi (A(g))|) + f2(|NUi (A(g))|)− f3(|Ai(g)|). (1)
We assume that for all x, x′ ≥ 0 and y ≤ x′, f1(x + y) + f2(x′ − y) > f1(x) + f2(x′). This
assumption, called (A1), implies that the payoff of agent i increases when simultaneously the
number of confirmed resources obtained by i increases by y, and the number of unconfirmed
resources obtained by i decreases by y. Moreover, since f3 is increasing, the payoff function of
player i decreases with the number of arcs she forms, given |NCi (A(g))| and |NUi (A(g))|.
In the following, sometimes it is only possible to obtain results for the linear payoff function
shown below:
piLi (A(g)) = V
C |NCi (A(g))|+ V U |NUi (A(g))| − c|Ai(g)|, (2)
with V C > V U > 0, and c > 0.
Equillibrium and efficient networks. The strategy Ai(g) is said to be a best response
of player i against the strategy A−i(g) if:
pii(Ai(g), A−i(g)) ≥ pii(A′, A−i(g)), for all A′ ∈ 2Gi . (3)
The set of all best responses of player i’s to A−i(g) is denoted by BRi(A−i(g)). A network g
is said to be a Nash network if Ai(g) ∈ BRi(A−i(g)) for each player i ∈ N . We define the set
of all strict best responses of player i to A−i(g), as sBRi(A−i(g)), and a strict Nash network
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by replacing ‘≥’ by ‘>’ and by setting A′ ∈ 2Gi \ {Ai(g)} in inequality 3.
We define the total payoff function as Π(g) =
∑
i∈N pii(A(g)). An efficient network g is a
network such that Π(g) ≥ Π(g′), for all g′ ∈ G.
3 Confirmation Model Analysis
3.1 Nash networks
First, we show that a Nash network in pure strategies does not always exist. This in itself is
interesting since it differs from the result obtained in the standard BG model; in that model
if the empty network is not Nash, then the periphery sponsored star is Nash. Second, we
provide a condition which illustrates the importance of the convexity of the cost function for
payoffs. This condition ensures the existence of Nash networks in pure strategies. Formally,
the function f3 is convex if f3(x+ 1)− f3(x) ≥ f3(x)− f3(x− 1), for all x ∈ {1, . . . , n− 2}.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 1. Then, there does not
always exist a Nash network in pure strategies. If payoff function is given by equation 1 and
f3 is convex, then a Nash network in pure strategies will always exist.
Proof First, we show through an example that if the payoff function is given by equation 1,
then there does not always exist a Nash network. Suppose N = {1, 2, 3}, f1(2) = 7, f2(1) = 5,
f2(2) = 5.5, f3(1) = 4 and f3(2) = 5.
17 We show that no network can be Nash. Clearly a Nash
network has at most 3 arcs. The empty network is not Nash since f1(0)+f2(2)−f3(2) = 0.5 >
0 = f1(0)+f2(0)−f3(0). A network with one arc is not Nash because for the player who is not
involved in the arc, we have: f1(0)+f2(2)−f3(1) = 1.5 > 0 = f1(0)+f2(0)−f3(0). So she has
an incentive to form an arc with one of the players. No network with two arcs can be Nash.
More precisely, in such a network either a player receives two arcs, or such a player does not ex-
ist. In the former case, we have: f1(2)+f2(0)−f3(2) = 2 > 1.5 = f1(0)+f2(2)−f3(1), and each
player who sponsors an arc has an incentive to add one more arc. In the latter case, we have:
f1(0)+f2(1)−f3(0) = 5 > 1.5 = f1(0)+f2(2)−f3(1), and one of the players who has sponsored
17It is worth noting that f1(1) cannot appear in this model. Similarly, if N = 3, then f2(3) and f3(3) cannot
appear in our example.
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an arc has an incentive to remove it. No network with three arcs can be Nash. More precisely,
in such a network there is at least one player who sponsors exactly one arc. This player is
better off deleting this arc as f1(2) + f2(0)− f3(1) = 7− 4 = 3 < 5.5 = f1(0) + f2(2)− f3(0).
This completes the proof of the first part.
For the second part, we show that a Nash network in pure strategies always exists when
f3 is convex. We will show that if the empty network and the periphery sponsored stars are
not Nash networks, then a wheel is a Nash network.
Let us begin with the empty network ge. In ge each player obtains a payoff equal to f1(0) +
f2(0) − f3(0). There are two cases: either ge is Nash and the proof is complete, or it is
not. In the latter case, players have an incentive to form arcs. It follows that there exists
x, 1 ≤ x ≤ n − 1, such that f1(0) + f2(x) − f3(x) > f1(0) + f2(0) − f3(0). Since f2 and f3
are strictly increasing, we have f1(0) + f2(n − 1) − f3(1) > f1(0) + f2(x) − f3(x) for some x,
1 ≤ x ≤ n − 1. In this case, players in a periphery sponsored star, gps, have no incentive
to remove arcs. There are two cases: either gps is Nash and the proof is complete, or it is
not. In the latter case, players have an incentive to form arcs in gps. Consequently, we have:
f1(x+1)+f2(n−x−2)−f3(1+x) > f1(0)+f2(n−1)−f3(1), for some x, 1 ≤ x ≤ n−2, that
is f1(x+ 1) + f2(n−x− 2)− (f1(0) + f2(n− 1)) > f3(1 +x)− f3(1), for some x, 1 ≤ x ≤ n− 2.
We show that if ge and gps are not Nash networks, then a wheel is a Nash network. Indeed,
we have f1(n− 1) + f2(0)− (f1(0) + f2(n− 1)) ≥ f1(x+ 1) + f2(n− x− 2)− (f1(0) + f2(n−
1)) > f3(1 + x) − f3(1) ≥ f3(1) − f3(0), for 1 ≤ x ≤ n − 2. The first inequality comes
from assumption A1, and the last inequality comes from the convexity of f3. It follows that
f1(n − 1) + f2(0) − f3(1) > f1(0) + f2(n − 1) − f3(0), that is no player in a wheel has an
incentive to remove her arc. It follows that a wheel is a Nash network. 
The intuition of the proof is as follows. If the empty network is not Nash, then each player
has an incentive to form at least one arc. There are two cases with this: either each player
accepts to maintain one arc when she obtains confirmed resources from all other players and
the wheel is Nash, or each player does not accept to maintain one arc when she obtains con-
firmed resources from all other players and the periphery sponsored star is Nash.
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Our second result highlights a general property of Nash networks: giving that linking is
costly, in equilibrium there do not exist superfluous arcs.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 1 and g is a Nash net-
work. Then, g is a base network.
Proof Let g be a Nash network. To introduce a contradiction, suppose g is not a base
network. Then, there is a costly arc, say ij, which can be deleted by player i such that
the resulting network allows player i to obtain the same total resources. This implies that
player i has a strict incentive to remove the arc ij. Consequently, g is not a Nash network, a
contradiction. 
The proof of the next proposition is given in Appendix A.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 1. Then, there exist
functions f1, f2 f3 such that any minimally unconfirmed network is a Nash network.
Proposition 3 illustrates that the set of Nash networks is very large.18 However, a Nash network
in which a player, say i, has multiple best responses is likely to be unstable since i may decide
to switch to another payoff equivalent strategy. This motivates the examination of strict Nash
networks discussed in the next section.
3.2 Strict Nash networks
We now introduce the two main propositions about the characterization of strict Nash net-
works, which we separate into connected strict Nash networks and strict Nash networks which
are not connected. Proposition 4 provides the architectures of connected strict Nash networks,
while Proposition 5 provides the architectures of non-connected strict Nash networks. Proofs
of these propositions are given in Appendix B. Recall that a key player is a player who is
involved in at least three arcs.
18Bala and Goyal (pg. 1194, [2]) show that the number of Nash networks increases rapidly with the number of
players in the standard BG model. In our framework, the number of Nash networks is larger than in the standard
BG model, since in equilibrium we obtain minimally unconfirmed (or minimally connected in the language of BG)
networks as well as confirmed networks.
13
Proposition 4 Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 1 and g is a connected
strict Nash network. Then, g is either (a) a minimally confirmed network where all key players
are the sponsors of all arcs they are involved in, or (b) a center sponsored star.
Recall that in the standard BG model only one player, the central player in the center
sponsored star, obtains a payoff different from the others in a non-empty strict Nash network.
However, once we introduce the notion of confirmed resources through independent paths, it
is possible that several players are in asymmetric positions. This is illustrated through the
example below.
Example 2 Suppose that N = {1, . . . , 7} and the payoff function is given by equation 2.
Moreover, suppose that V C = 100, V U = 1 and c = 10. Then, network g in Figure 4 is a strict
Nash network. In this network, all players obtain the same gross profit but players 4 and 6
incur the costs of 3 arcs, players 1 and 2 incur the costs of 1 arc and players 5 and 7 incur no
cost at all.
7
1 2 3
4 5 6
Figure 4: Network g
The presence of key players in our model is an interesting finding. It is similar to the role
played by the central player in a center sponsored star in the standard BG model: she incurs
the cost of forming arcs and allows other players to be connected. More generally, the fact
that two disjoint u-paths can raise payoffs, leads to a richer set of equilibrium outcomes in our
model. We now turn to the characterization of another type of strict Nash networks where
equilibrium networks among ex ante homogeneous players need not be connected.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 1 and g is a non-empty
and non-connected strict Nash network. Then, g contains x, x ≥ 1, wheels and a sub-network
g|N\W . Moreover, g|N\W is empty, or a minimally confirmed network where all key players are
the sponsors of all arcs they are involved in.
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In the network literature, strict Nash networks are usually connected and with ex ante homoge-
neous agents, they are always connected. The typical reason is that by mimicking the strategy
of a player who sponsors some arcs in a different component, one can obtain a higher net
benefit just like that player. Therefore, if a network is not connected, there is one player who
would strictly prefer to copy the strategy of a player in a different component. Consequently
equilibrium networks are connected. In our model this is not the case. In a wheel for instance,
each player i must form two arcs with players in a wheel to obtain confirmed resources from
them while players in a wheel have formed only one arc in g. We now illustrate through an
example that there exist parameters such that a network g which contains several wheels is a
strict Nash. In other words, a non-empty and non-connected network is a strict Nash network.
This result differs from the standard BG model.
Example 3 Suppose the payoff function is given by equation 1 and V C = 5, V U = 0.25,
c = 9. Suppose N = {1, . . . , 6} and let g be such that A(g) = {12, 23, 31, 45, 56, 64}. Then,
g is a non-empty strict Nash network which is not connected.
Note that strict Nash networks have two interesting properties. In a strict Nash network
1. A player cannot obtain both confirmed and unconfirmed resources simultaneously; and
2. There cannot exist players who obtain unconfirmed resources along with players who
obtain confirmed resources.
However, it is worth noting that players do not always obtain the same amount of resources.
In the extreme case as stated in Proposition 5, some of them may receive no resources while
others receive a strictly positive amount of confirmed resources.
3.3 Efficient networks
In the standard BG model, in general, an efficient network needs not be either connected or
empty (see example pg. 1205, [2]). When the payoff function is linear, Bala and Goyal show
that in the standard BG model, minimally unconfirmed networks and the empty network are
the only candidates for efficient networks. In this section, we deal with efficient networks when
the confirmation assumption is introduced.
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Proposition 6 Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 1, and g is an efficient
network. Then, g is a minimal base network. Moreover, if 2[minx∈{0,...,n−2}{f2(x + 1) −
f2(x)}] > maxy∈{0,...,n−2}{f3(y + 1) − f3(y)}, then an efficient network is connected. Sup-
pose in addition that 3[minx∈{0,...,n−3},y∈{2,...,n−1}{f1(x + 2) + f2(y − 2) − (f1(x) + f2(y))}] >
maxz∈{0,...,n−2}{f3(z+1)−f3(z)}, then an efficient network is a minimally confirmed network.
Proof We prove successively the three parts of the proposition.
Suppose g is not a minimal base network. Then, there is a minimal base network g′ which
allows each player to obtain the same total resources and involves fewer arcs. Hence g is not
an efficient network, a contradiction.
Suppose MB1 = 2[minx∈{0,...,n−2}{f2(x+ 1)− f2(x)}] > maxy∈{0,...,n−2}{f3(y + 1)− f3(y)} =
MC. To introduce a contradiction, suppose there exist two players i and j who are not
connected in g. Note that MB1 gives the minimum benefit for two players from an arc
connecting them, whereas MC gives the maximal possible cost of an arc. As arcs can only
provide positive externalities to other players, this condition guarantees that an arc between
these two players is welfare improving.
Let MB1 > MC and MB2 = 3 [minx∈{0,...,n−3},y∈{2,...,n−1}{f1(x + 2) + f2(y − 2) − (f1(x) +
f2(y))}] > MC. Since MB1 > MC and g is efficient, g is connected and a minimal base
network. To introduce a contradiction, suppose that g is not minimally confirmed. Then there
exist three players i, i′, and j such that i′i ∈ A(g), ij 6∈ A(g), and players i and i′ do not
obtain confirmed resources from j. There are two possibilities.
(a) Players i and i′ do not obtain confirmed resources from each other in g. In that case,
either there exists a u-path between i and j which does not go through i′, or there exists a
u-path between i′ and j which does not go through i. Wlog we assume that the latter is true.
Since g is connected, if the link ij is added in g, then each player obtains confirmed resources
from the two other players and the additional benefits for the three players is at least MB2.
Moreover, the maximal additional cost associated with the link ij is MC. The contradiction
follows from the fact that MB2 > MC.
(b) Players i and i′ obtain confirmed resources from each other in g. Then there exists a player
j′ who obtains confirmed resources from i and i′. If j′ does not obtain confirmed resources from
j, then we use the same argument as in (a). If j′ obtains confirmed resources from j, then there
exists a player k who obtains confirmed resources from j and j′, and unconfirmed resources
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from i and i′ otherwise g is not a minimal base network. Thus, if the link ij is added in g, then
players i, i′, j and k obtain confirmed resources from the others and the additional benefits for
these players is 4[minx∈{0,...,n−3},y∈{2,...,n−1}{f1(x+ 2) + f2(y − 2)− (f1(x) + f2(y))}] > MB2.
The contradiction follows from the fact that MB2 > MC. 
It is hard to say more about efficient networks under equation 1. However, it is possible
to characterize efficient networks when the payoff function is linear and we do this next. Note
that in each minimally unconfirmed network, there are n− 1 arcs and each player obtains the
unconfirmed information of each other. Hence, the total payoff obtained in such networks is
(n − 1)(nV U − c) when the payoff function is linear. Likewise, in each minimal cycle there
are n arcs and each player obtains the confirmed information of each other. Hence, the total
payoff obtained in such networks is n((n− 1)V C − c) when the payoff function is linear.
Proposition 7 Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 2 and the empty network
is not efficient. Let g be an efficient network. Then, g is either a minimal unconfirmed
network, or a minimal cycle network. Moreover, if n(n − 1)(V C − V U ) < c, then g is a
minimal unconfirmed network; and if n(n − 1)(V C − V U ) > c, then g is a minimal cycle
network.
Proof Let g be an efficient network. First, we show that g is either connected or empty. We
know by Proposition 6 that an efficient network is a minimal base network. To introduce a
contradiction, suppose that g is non-empty and non-connected. There are two cases: either g
contains a cycle, or g does not contain any cycle.
1. Suppose that g contains a cycle, and so a MECS. We show that there is no player who does
not belong to the MECS and who is directly connected with a player in the MECS in g. To
introduce a contradiction, suppose a MECS in g, T1(g), which contains players i and j, with
ij ∈ A(g) and let player ` 6∈ T1(g) such that i` ∈ A(g). We define the network g′ as follows
A(g′) = A(g)− ij + `j. We have
Π(g′)−Π(g) = 2|T1(g)|(V C − V U ) > 0.
Consequently, g is not efficient, a contradiction. We now show that there does not exist a
player ` who is not connected to the MECS in g. Again, let players i and j belong to the
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MECS T1(g) with ij ∈ A(g). Since g is efficient, we have:
|T1(g)|(|T1(g)| − 1)V C − |T1(g)|c ≥ 0⇒ (|T1(g)| − 1)V C − c ≥ 0.
Since g is not connected, there exists a player ` who is not connected with player i. Let g′ be
a network such that A(g′) = A(g)− ij + i`+ `j. We have
0 ≤ (|T1(g)|−1)V C−c < (2|T1(g)|−1)V C−c = (|T1(g)|2−(|T1(g)|−1)2)V C−c ≤ Π(g′)−Π(g).
It follows that g is not efficient, a contradiction.
2. Suppose that g contains no cycle. Since g is non-empty, there is a component g|Y , |Y | ≥ 2,
in g. We assume that players i and j belong to X with ij ∈ A(g). Since g is efficient, we have
|Y |(|Y | − 1)V U − (|Y | − 1)c ≥ 0⇒ |Y |V U − c ≥ 0.
Since g is not connected, there is a player ` 6∈ Y who is not connected with i. Let g′′ be a
network such that A(g′′) = A(g) + i`. We have
0 ≤ |Y |V U − c < 2|Y |V U − c ≤ Π(g′′)−Π(g).
It follows that g is not efficient, a contradiction.
Let g be a non-empty network. Clearly, g cannot contain more than n arcs since with n arcs it
is possible to construct a minimal cycle network where all resources are confirmed. Moreover,
g cannot have less than n− 1 arcs since it is connected.
In a minimal cycle network, the total payoff is n(n − 1)V C − nc. Moreover, with n − 1 arcs
it is possible to construct a minimal unconfirmed network which gives access to unconfirmed
information of all the other players. In this network, the total payoff is n(n− 1)V U − (n− 1)c.
It follows that if n(n − 1)(V C − V U ) < c, then g is a minimal unconfirmed network, and if
n(n− 1)(V C − V U ) > c, then g is a minimal cycle network.

We now examine the relationship between strict Nash networks and efficient networks when
the payoff function is linear. First, we establish through an example that strict Nash networks
and efficient networks do not always coincide. The reason, of course, is the positive externalities
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of link formation.
Example 4 Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 2 and V C < c, nV U > c
and V C − V U < c/[n(n− 1)]. Center sponsored stars are efficient networks. Indeed, the total
payoff obtained in center sponsored stars is greater than (i) the total payoff obtained in the
empty network: (n − 1)(nV U − c) > 0 since nV U > c; and (ii) the total payoff obtained in
minimal cycles: (n− 1)(nV U − c) > n((n− 1)V C − c) since V C −V U < c/[n(n− 1)]. However,
a center sponsored star is not a strict Nash network since the player who sponsors the arcs has
no incentive to maintain them given that V U < c.
Next, we provide conditions which ensure the coincidence of strict Nash networks and
efficient networks under the linear payoff function.
Proposition 8 Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 2.
1. If a minimal cycle network, gmc, is a strict Nash network, then gmc is an efficient
network.
2. If the empty network, ge, is an efficient network, then ge is a strict Nash network.
3. Suppose V U > c and V C − V U < c/[n(n − 1)]. Then a center sponsored star is both a
strict Nash network and an efficient network.
Proof We begin with an initial observation. Consider a network g. Note that each arc in
g creates positive externalities. More precisely, for a given arc ij ∈ A(g), no player, except i,
incurs any losses because of this arc: it costs them nothing but it may add to their unconfirmed
resources or upgrade their unconfirmed resources to confirmed resources. Part 1 and Part 2 of
the proposition follows this observation. We now prove Part 3 of the proposition.
Suppose that V U > c and V C − V U < c/[n(n− 1)]. Let gps be a center sponsored star where
player j is the sponsor of the arcs. First, we show that player j has no incentive to remove
any of her arcs in gps. If player j removes x arcs in gps, she obtains a marginal payoff equal
to A1 = x(c− V U ). A1 is negative since V U > c. Second, we show that it is inefficient to add
arcs in gps. To introduce a contradiction, suppose that some arcs are added in gps. Then the
incremental payoff associated with each of them is bounded above by n(n− 1)(V C − V U )− c.
By assumption n(n − 1)(V C − V U ) − c < 0, and we obtain a contradiction. We conclude by
using the initial observation. 
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4 Heterogeneous players: Journalists
In this section we introduce heterogeneity among the players with respect to how they value
information. We assume that a fraction of the players only value confirmed information and
call them journalists. Since journalists are in the business of presenting information, they will
tend to care more about confirmed information than the average businessman, or politician.
This is simply because unconfirmed information cannot be published, while the others can still
act upon unconfirmed information if it is too costly to acquire the confirmed information. In
this section we capture this by introducing a subset of the population, say J ⊆ N where J is
the set of journalists, that does not value unconfirmed information. Note that this also serves
to act as robustness check for our first model where all agents are identical. The introduction of
journalists allows us to focus on network architectures that are primarily driven by confirmed
information. Players in N\J are called ordinary players. We are interested whether such
player heterogeneity will significantly alter the architectures of the strict Nash networks.
For simplicity we will base this extension on equation 1. Formally, for any j ∈ J the payoff
function becomes
piJj (A (g)) = f1
(∣∣NCj (A (g))∣∣)− f3 (|Aj (g)|) , (4)
while for any player i ∈ N\J , the payoff function remains the same as in equation 1. To keep
the proposition simple, we assume that the number of ordinary players is at least three, so
|N\J | ≥ 1. It is worth noting that if J = N , then the empty network is a strict Nash network.
No journalist in an empty network has an incentive to add arcs, as such a unilateral action
does not give him confirmed information. Proof of the next proposition is given in Appendix
C.
Proposition 9 Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 1 for ordinary players
and by equation 4 for journalists, and let |J | > 0. Then,
1. if g is a connected strict Nash network, g contains one MECS, say X ⊆ N . If there
exists some player k ∈ N\X, then (a) Vk (g) is a singleton, say Vk (g) = {i} , where
i ∈ X and ik ∈ A(g); and (b) i, k ∈ N\J ;
2. if g is a non-connected, non-empty strict Nash network, then g contains x, x ≥ 1, wheels
and a sub-network g|N\W . Moreover, g|N\W is empty, or a minimally confirmed network
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where all key players are the sponsors of all arcs they are involved in.
The discussion above suggests that the presence of journalists in the population impacts the set
of equilibrium networks in two ways. First, the center sponsored star cannot be a strict Nash
network anymore for any |J | > 0. This of course depends on the f2 function for journalists.
If journalists would receive some small, positive benefit from unconfirmed information, then
the center sponsored star could still be a strict Nash network, albeit for a smaller range of
parameters. Second, there exist situations such that network g1 in Figure 5.a, with players
1, 2, 3 ∈ J and players 4, 5, 6 ∈ N \ J , is a strict Nash network.19 In this network a subset of
players are confirmed connected, and all other players only receive unconfirmed information
but are connected to the confirmed subset. In such a network all journalists are part of the
confirmed connected subset, which seems intuitive.
The introduction of journalists also has intuitive effects in another respect. In the propo-
sition above, we have largely ignored the allocation of journalists and ordinary players over
the different network positions. We only found that journalists cannot be involved in arcs
through which no information is confirmed (part 2). However, it would seem natural to find
journalists relatively often at key positions within the network, where several cycles are linked
together. The reason is that journalists care more about getting information confirmed, and
therefore they are more willing to sponsor the ‘second’ of the arcs in any particular cycle that
they are part of in their role as key players. Example 5 illustrates that there exist parameter
ranges where the role of key players is occupied only by journalists. It shows a network and
parameter values, where in equilibrium there are only two key positions and these can only be
held by journalists. Ordinary players will not occupy these positions, since in these positions
they would strictly prefer to delete at least one arc. Clearly, this network can only be stable
if there are at least two journalists in the population. To finalize our argument, note that the
opposite cannot be the case: no journalist would prefer to delete an arc in a cycle that an
ordinary player is willing to sponsor, as the journalist would lose more benefits from identical
cost saving of forming arcs. Thus we obtain the intuitive result that journalists are relatively
likely to be found in key positions of strict Nash networks.
19For instance, g1 is a strict Nash network if f1(x) = 10x, f2(x) = 9x, and f3(1) = 11, f3(2) = 22, f3(3) = 33,
f3(4) = 34.
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Example 5 We assume that the payoff function of each player in N \ J is given by equation
2, where V C > 0, V U > 0, and c > 0. Similarly we assume that the payoff function of each
player in J is given by equation 2, where V C > 0, V U = 0, and c > 0. Let g be the network
given in Figure 4. Suppose that V C > c and V C − V U < c < 6(V C − V U ). Moreover, suppose
that J = {4, 6} and N \ J = {1, 2, 3, 5, 7}. Then g is a strict Nash network. Suppose now that
J = {1, 6} and N \ J = {2, 3, 4, 5, 7}. Then player 4 does not play a strict best response since
she has an incentive to remove her arc with player 5. Consequently, g is not a strict Nash
network.
Note that the presence of journalists has an ambiguous effect on social welfare. Welfare may
go up because arcs that create cycles induce positive externalities, and therefore the fact that
journalists facilitate cycles can be beneficial. However, the presence of journalists may allow for
networks with small cycles to belong to the set of strict Nash networks. Networks with small
cycles are less efficient than those with large cycles. We illustrate these points in Example 6.
Example 6 Let N = {1, . . . , 7} be the set of players. We assume that the payoff function of
each player in N \ J is given by equation 2, where V C > 0, V U > 0, and c > 0. Similarly
we assume that the payoff function of each player in J is given by equation 2, where V C > 0,
V U = 0, and c > 0. First we assume that 2(V C − V U ) < c < 3(V C − V U ), 3V U < c, and
c < 2V C . If J = {1, 2, 3}, then network g2 drawn in Figure 5.b is a strict Nash network, while
a cycle which belongs to a strict Nash network would contain more players if all players were
ordinary players. Second, we assume that 6(V C − V U ) < c < 3V C . If J = {1, 2, 3, 4}, then
network g3 drawn in 5.c is a strict Nash network, while if all players were ordinary players,
then a minimally confirmed network is not a strict Nash network.
3
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a. Network g1 b. Network g2 c. Network g3
Figure 5: Networks g1, g2 and g3
22
5 Bilaterally rational networks
The network formation literature on Nash networks mostly uses strict Nash networks to study
the equilibrium networks. But there has been almost no attempts to study their robustness as
an equilibrium concept. Hence in this section we undertake this task. Moreover we feel that
this is important since it will allow us to check the robustness of our results which happen to
include the results of the standard Bala and Goyal model in the form of unconfirmed networks.
We now allow the possibility for players to make some bilateral deviations. To capture the
possibility of bilateral deviations in our setting, we use bilaterally rational networks which are
inspired by Kim and Wong (see definition 2, pg. 540, [14]). A bilaterally rational network is
a strict Nash network where given all other players strategies, no pair of players can propose
a joint change in their own strategies that strictly improves the payoff of one of them without
reducing the payoff of the other. This assumption is intuitively reasonable and can be as a
minimal assumption that captures the cooperative or joint behavior of players. We now define
this notion formally. Let A−ij(g) =
⋃
`∈N\{i,j}A`(g) denotes the strategies profile played by
all players except i and j. The pair of strategies Aij(g) = (Ai(g), Aj(g))
20 is said to be a
bilateral best response of players i and j against the strategy A−ij(g) if there is no pair of
strategies A′ij ∈ 2Gi × 2Gj \Aij(g), such that
pii(Aij(g), A−ij(g)) ≤ pii(A′ij , A−ij(g)) and pij(Aij(g), A−ij(g)) < pij(A′ij , A−ij(g)). (5)
Inequalities 5 capture the idea that no pair of agents can make a joint deviation to create
a Pareto improvement for themselves. The set of all bilateral best responses of players i
and j to A−ij(g) is denoted by BBRij(A−ij). A network g is said to be a bilaterally ratio-
nal network if (Ai(g), Aj(g)) ∈ BBRij(A−ij) for each pair of players (i, j) ∈ N × N and if
Ai(g) ∈ sBRi(A−i(g)).
Finally, we introduce strict bilaterally rational networks. In this case, Inequalities 5 are re-
placed by the following one:
pii(Aij(g), A−ij(g)) ≤ pii(A′ij , A−ij(g)) and pij(Aij(g), A−ij(g)) ≤ pij(A′ij , A−ij(g)). (6)
20Aij(g) can be interpreted as Ai(g) ∪Aj(g).
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Inequalities 6 capture the idea that no pair of agents can make a joint deviation to create a
weak Pareto improvement for themselves. More precisely, in absence of coordination costs,
Inequalities 6 capture the notion that players should strictly prefer not to deviate. Thus strict
bilaterally rational networks play the same role relative to bilaterally rational networks as the
role played by strict Nash networks relative to Nash networks.
We present the main propositions that characterize the architectures of bilaterally rational
and strict bilaterally rational networks. Proofs of Propositions 10 and 11 are provided in
Appendix D. First, we characterize bilaterally rational networks.
Proposition 10 Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 1 and g is a non-empty
bilaterally rational network. Then, g is a minimally confirmed network where all key players
are the sponsors of all arcs they are involved in, or a center sponsored star.
Note that non-empty bilaterally rational networks are always connected, whereas non-
empty strict Nash networks need not be: an equilibrium network may have multiple com-
ponents provided that at most one component is not a wheel (Proposition 5). The reason
a bilaterally rational network is connected is as follows. Consider a non-empty and non-
connected strict Nash network g. Such a network g contains a wheel. Let jj′ be an arc in the
wheel, and let player i belong to another component. Then i can become part of the wheel at
a cost of one arc, by sponsoring ij′ and asking player j to replace his arc to j′ by an arc to
player i. Player j would not lose by doing so, making this an eligible deviation. Second, we
characterize strict bilaterally rational networks.
Proposition 11 Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 1 and g is a non-empty
strict bilaterally rational network. Then, g is a center sponsored star, or a minimal cycle, or a
complete bipartite network containing two key players who are linked with all non key players.
These non key players are at least 3.
Strict bilaterally rational networks allow for a refinement of the set of strict Nash networks.
Indeed, the strict Nash network drawn in Figure 4 is not a strict bilaterally rational network.
We illustrate complete bipartite networks containing two key players who are linked with at
least three non key players in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Network g
6 Decay and Confirmation Networks
In the payoff functions used till now, reliability is generally used when we have node or link
failure. Here we assumed that unconfirmed resources obtained through indirect arcs have the
same value as those obtained through direct arcs. This assumption is strong; in general, there
may be a reduction in value (due to loss in accuracy or distortion of information), as resources
are transmitted through a series of players. More precisely, if player i obtains unconfirmed
resources from player j through a long sequence of intermediate players, then she should
have a greater incentive to confirm information, than if she obtains unconfirmed resources
from player j through fewer intermediaries. Formally this is akin to requiring confirmation in
Jackson and Wolinky’s [11] “connections” model. To formalize this idea, define the distance
dg(i, j) between players i and j to be the number of arcs along the shortest u-path between
i and j in g. We denote the number of non-confirmed players at distance m from i in the
network g by nmi (A(g)). The payoff of player i in g is given by:
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pii(A(g)) = |NCi (A(g))|+
n−1∑
w=1
αwn
w
i (A(g))− c|Ai(g)|. (7)
The positive weights α1, α2, ..., αn−1 measure the relative importance of neighbors at different
distances. We assume that 1 > α1 ≥ α2 ≥ ... ≥ αn−1, so that more distant players yield
less benefits. Since 1 > α1 each player prefers to obtain confirmed resources over unconfirmed
resources, given the number of arcs she forms. Note that the payoff function given by Equation
1 assumes that resources obtained through the network become more valuable on confirmation.
However, the architecture of the network does not affect the value of the resources transmitted
through it. By contrast, the payoff function given by Equation 7 says that unconfirmed
21This function is inspired by the payoff function in Hojman and Szeidl [10]. It generalizes the payoff function
with decay introduced by Bala and Goyal [2].
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resources obtained through more intermediaries is worth less than resources obtained through
fewer intermediary players. In other words, the architecture of the network plays a role by
being able to affect the value of the resources transmitted through it. We now briefly sum up
the impact of the decay assumption in our confirmation model on equilibrium architectures.22
First, under Equation 7 we can obtain a result similar to Proposition 4. In other words non-
empty acyclic strict Nash networks are minimally unconfirmed networks. The intuition is the
same in that linking is costly and hence leads to minimally unconfirmed networks.
Moreover, using continuity we can construct a situation similar to Example 3 where strict
Nash networks are not always connected. This happens when costs of linking are high relative
to the value of confirmed information. Then it is possible to construct scenarios consisting of
unconfirmed networks that are minimal. Of course when the costs of linking are lower than
the benefits of a direct arc, strict Nash networks will always be connected. In fact it is easy to
identify conditions that make stars strict Nash. Moreover, if c < min{α1, 1− α2}, then strict
Nash networks are minimally confirmed networks. Basically if c < 1−α2, then it is worthwhile
to initiate an arc to a player who is two steps away (decay creates strong incentives to avoid
long u-paths) allowing for confirmation. Similar results hold for bilaterally rational networks
under decay.
7 Conclusion
In this model of network formation we consider the need for alternate paths between the same
agents in the network. This is motivated by the desire to have more valuable information.
Information obtained from two different paths is considered to be confirmed and hence is of
higher value. We characterize the strict Nash and efficient networks in the game. Interestingly,
we find that although two independent paths may be desirable, there exist parameter ranges
where equilibrium networks are non-empty and non-connected. We check the robustness of
our results in three ways. First, we assume that players are heterogenous with regard to
the value they obtain from unconfirmed information. We establish that who care more about
confirmation are more likely to be found in key positions of networks. Second, we introduce the
22Detailed proofs for this section can be found in the working paper version at http://bus.lsu.edu/McMillin/
Working_Papers/pap12_02.pdf.
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notion of strict bilateral rational network. This acts as a robustness check for the commonly
used notion of strict Nash networks. Our main finding here is that by taking into account
the decisions of a pair of agents, this criterion ensures that non-empty equilibrium networks
are always connected. A third extension considers the role of decay and its implication for
confirmed information. Decay creates incentives for shorter u-paths between agents, we find
that again it is possible to have both minimally unconfirmed networks (stars) and minimally
confirmed networks as strict Nash networks.
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Appendix
Appendix A. Nash networks
Proof of Proposition 3. We first define three properties that the functions f1, f2 and f3
need to satisfy.
• (P1) for all x ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and z ∈ {0, . . . , n− 2} we have:
f1(x) + f2(n− 1− x)− [f1(0) + f2(n− 1)] < f3(z + 1)− f3(z).
• (P2) for all x ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, z ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}, with x < x′, z ≤ z′ and x′−x > z′− z,
we have:
f1(x) + f2(n− 1− x′)− [f1(0) + f2(n− 1)] < f3(z′)− f3(z).
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• (P3) We have for all x ∈ {0, . . . , n− 2}:
f2(x+ 1)− f2(x) > f3(x+ 1)− f3(x).
Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 1 and f1, f2, f3 satisfy P1, P2 and P3.
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To introduce a contradiction, consider a minimally unconfirmed network g which is not a Nash
network. Since g is a minimally unconfirmed network, it is obvious that g is a base network
where each player obtains n − 1 unconfirmed resources from others. Since g is not a Nash
network there exists a player, say i, who has a strict incentive to modify her strategy. Let Ei
be the alternative strategy chosen by player i. There exist three kinds of alternative strategies
for player i in g: (a) |Ei| = |Ai(g)|, with Ei 6= Ai(g), (b) |Ei| < |Ai(g)|, (c) |Ei| > |Ai(g)|.
We deal successively with these three cases.
(a) Suppose |Ei| = |Ai(g)|, with Ei 6= Ai(g). There are two possibilities concerning the
resources that player i obtains in g′ with A(g′) = Ei ∪A−i(g).
- Player i does not obtain confirmed resources in g′. Since player i obtains n− 1 unconfirmed
resources in g, the amount of unconfirmed resources in g′ cannot exceed the amount of resources
she obtains in g. Moreover, player i incurs the same costs in g and g′. Consequently, player i
obtains a payoff in g′ which is smaller or equal to the payoff she obtains in g.
- Player i obtains x, x > 0, confirmed resources in g′. Since g is a base network, in g′ player
i obtains a number of unconfirmed resources equal to n − 1 − x′ with x′ > x. Moreover,
player i incurs the same costs in network g and in network g′. We conclude by P2 that
pii(g
′)− pii(g) = f1(x) + f2(n− 1− x′)− (f1(0) + f2(n− 1)) < 0.
To sum up, if |Ei| = |Ai(g)|, with Ei 6= Ai(g), then Ei cannot strictly improve the payoff of
player i.
(b) Suppose |Ei| < |Ai(g)|. There are two possibilities concerning the resources that player i
obtains in g′ with A(g′) = Ei ∪A−i(g).
- Player i does not obtain confirmed resources in g′. Since g is a base network and player i forms
|Ei| < |Ai(g)| arcs, in g′ she obtains n−1−x′ unconfirmed resources, with x′ ≥ |Ai(g)|− |Ei|.
By P3 and the fact that f2 and f3 are increasing, we have pii(g
′) = f1(0) + f2(n − 1 − x′) −
f3(|Ei|) < f1(0) + f2(n− 1)− f3(|Ai(g)|) = pii(g).
23For example, let N = {1, . . . , 9} and f1(x) = 2.1x+ 3, f2(x) = 2x, and f3(x) = x. Then these functions satisfy
P1, P2 and P3.
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- Player i obtains x, x > 0, confirmed resources in g′. Since g is a base network, in g′ player i
obtains n−1−x′ unconfirmed resources, with x′ > x and x′−x > |Ai(g)|−|Ei|. Consequently,
by P2 we have pii(g
′) = f1(x)+f2(n−1−x′)−f3(|Ei|) < f1(0)+f2(n−1)−f3(|Ai(g)|) = pii(g).
To sum up, if |Ei| < |Ai(g)|, then Ei cannot strictly improve the payoff of player i.
(c) Suppose |Ei| > |Ai(g)|. There are two possibilities concerning the resources that player i
obtains in g′ with A(g′) = Ei ∪A−i(g).
- Player i does not obtain confirmed resources in g′. Player i does not obtain more unconfirmed
resources in network g′ than in network g. Moreover, player i incurs higher costs in g′ than
in g. Consequently, Ei does not improve the payoff of player i.
- Player i obtains x, x > 0, confirmed resources in g′. Since player i obtains n−1 unconfirmed
resources in g, she obtains at most n−1−x unconfirmed resources in g′. By P1 and the fact that
f3 is increasing, we have pii(g
′) ≤ f1(x)+f2(n−1−x)−f3(|Ei|) < f1(0)+f2(n−1)−f3(|Ai(g)|) =
pii(g).
To sum up, if |Ei| > |Ai(g)|, then Ei cannot strictly improve the payoff of player i. It follows
that there does not exist an alternative strategy which allows player i to strictly improve her
payoff, a contradiction. 
Appendix B. Strict Nash networks
We present five lemmas that allow us to characterize the strict Nash networks. To prove the
first one, we need to construct from g a bipartite network called gM . The set of vertices of
gM is M(g) ∪ EM (g). There is a link between i ∈ M(g) and X(g) ∈ EM (g) if i belongs to
X(g) in gM .24 In the next example, we illustrate the construction of the network gM from g.
Example 7 We construct from network g in Figure 4.a, the network gM associated with g
in Figure 4.b.
Notice that by construction the network gM contains no cycle, otherwise the set EM (g) is not
well defined.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 1 and g is a strict Nash
network. Then, M(g) = ∅.
24In gM the direction of the arcs plays no role. Consequently, we use “link” instead of “arc” for the network gM .
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Figure 7: Construction of gM
Proof We prove the lemma in two steps. First, we establish that each MECS has at most
one link in gM . Second, we use this result to show that M(g) = ∅.
1. We establish that each MECS has at most one link in gM . To introduce a contradiction
suppose that there is a MECS, say X(g), that has two links in gM . In the following, we
focus on the component, say Z(g), which contains X(g) in gM . We know that gM is
acyclic, so Z(g) is acyclic. Consequently, there are two vertices in Z(g) which have only
one link. Moreover, by construction, each vertex in M(g) which belongs to Z(g) has
links with at least two vertices in Z(g). It follows that there are two vertices in EM (g)
which have only one link in Z(g). We conclude that there exist two MECS which belong
to Z(g), say Xm(g) ∈ EM (g) and X ′m(g) ∈ EM (g), which contain only one player who
belongs to M(g). We denote by im the unique player in M(g) who belongs to Xm(g)
and by i′m the unique player in M(g) who belongs to X ′m(g). Since a MECS contains at
least 3 players, Xm(g) contains at least two players, say j /∈ M(g) and k /∈ M(g), such
that jk ∈ A(g). By using the same arguments X ′m(g) contains two players j′ /∈ M(g)
and k′ /∈M(g) such that j′k′ ∈ A(g).
We now show that players j and j′ cannot play simultaneously a strict best response in
g. We define g′ as the network such that A(g′) = A(g) + jk′ − jk. Likewise, we define
g′′ as the network such that A(g′′) = A(g) + j′k − j′k′.
Let x < |Xm(g)|−1 be the number of confirmed resources that player j obtains when she
removes her arc with player k in g and let x′ < |X ′m(g)| − 1 be the number of confirmed
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resources that player j′ obtains when she removes her arc with player k′ in g. Likewise,
let y be the number of confirmed resources that player j obtains in g′ from players who
belong neither to Xm(g), nor to X
′
m(g) (it is also the number of confirmed resources that
player j′ obtains in g′′ from players who belong neither to Xm(g), nor to X ′m(g)).
Let K be the number of players from whom player j obtains unconfirmed resources and
who do not belong to X ′m(g) (it is also the number of players from whom player j′ obtains
unconfirmed resources and who do not belong to Xm(g)). We now establish that either
j, or j′ can shift an arc such that her number of confirmed resources increases, while her
number of unconfirmed resources she receives and the number of arcs she forms are the
same. Suppose that player j replaces the arc jk by the arc jk′. We have:
∆j = pij(A(g
′))− pij(A(g)) = f1(x+ y + |X ′m|) + f2(K + (|Xm| − 1− x− y))
−f1(|Xm| − 1)− f2(K + |X ′m|).
We obtain:
0 > ∆j ≥ f1(|X ′m|) + f2(K + |Xm| − 1)− f1(|Xm| − 1)− f2(K + |X ′m|). (8)
The first inequality comes from the strict Nash property of g and the second inequality
comes from the assumption (A1) made on the payoff function.
Suppose that player j′ replaces the arc j′k′ by the arc j′k. We have:
∆j′ = pij′(A(g
′))− pij′(A(g)) = f2(K + (|X ′m(g)| − 1− x′ − y))
+f1(x
′ + y + |Xm(g)|)
−f1(|X ′m(g)| − 1)− f2(K + |Xm(g)|).
We obtain:
0 > ∆j′ ≥ f1(|Xm(g)|) + f2(K + |X ′m(g)| − 1)− f1(|X ′m(g)| − 1)− f2(K + |Xm(g)|). (9)
The first inequality comes from the strict Nash property of g and the second inequality
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comes from the assumption (A1) made on the payoff function. By Assumption (A1), we
have f1(|X ′m(g)|) + f2(K + (|Xm(g)| − 1)) > f1(|X ′m(g)| − 1) + f2(K + (|Xm(g)|)) and
f1(|Xm(g)|) + f2(K + (|X ′m(g)| − 1)) > f1(|Xm(g)| − 1) + f2(K + (|X ′m(g)|)). It follows
that equations 8 and 9 are not compatible. A contradiction.
2. We now show that M(g) = ∅. Suppose g is a strict Nash network and i ∈M(g). We call
X and X ′ two MECS which contain i. Since a MECS has at most one link in gM , players
i ∈ M(g) are not connected in gM . Hence, there is no player j ∈ M(g) who belongs to
X or X ′. Since each MECS contains at least 3 players, there are two players j 6∈ M(g)
and k 6∈M(g) in X and two players j′ 6∈M(g) and k′ 6∈M(g) in X ′ such that jk ∈ A(g)
and j′k′ ∈ A(g). Hence, we can use the arguments given in the proof of the previous
point to show that it is not possible that player j does not have any incentive to replace
the arc jk by the arc jk′ and that simultaneously player j′ does not have any incentive
to replace the arc j′k′ by the arc j′k. Consequently, g is not a strict Nash network, a
contradiction.

Lemma 2 Let g be a strict Nash network and let X be a MECS in g. Suppose i ∈ X, j 6∈ X
and ij ∈ A(g). Then, (a) no player k ∈ X sponsors an arc with i in g, (b) ij ∈ A(g), and (c)
Vj(g) = {i}.
Proof Let g be a strict Nash network and let X be a MECS in g. Suppose i ∈ X, j 6∈ X.
We prove successively the three parts of the Lemma.
1. To introduce a contradiction suppose there is k ∈ X such that ki ∈ A(g). By con-
struction, player k does not obtain confirmed resources from player j otherwise X is
not a MECS. If player k replaces the arc ki by the arc kj, she increases the number
of confirmed resources by 1, and decreases the number of unconfirmed resources by 1.
Therefore, player k does not play a strict best response in g by Assumption (A1), and g
is not a strict Nash network, a contradiction.
2. To introduce a contradiction suppose that ji ∈ A(g). Since i ∈ X, there exists another
player k ∈ X. If player j /∈ X replaces the arc j i by jk, then she obtains the same payoff
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as in g. Consequently, j does not play a strict best response in g, and g is not a strict
Nash network, a contradiction.
3. To introduce a contradiction, suppose that there is a player j′ ∈ Vj(g)\{i}. Clearly, there
is no other u-path between i and j′ in g other than the one going through j. Otherwise
i ∈ M(g) which is impossible by Lemma 1. Consequently, if player i replaces the arc ij
by the arc ij′, then she obtains the same payoff as in g. It follows that i does not play a
strict best response in g, and g is not a strict Nash network, a contradiction.

Lemma 3 Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 1 and g is a strict Nash
network. Let X be a MECS of g. If i ∈ X and i is a key player, then i is the sponsor of all
the arcs she is involved in.
Proof Let g be a strict Nash network. Let X be a MECS of g and let i be a key player who
belongs to X. Suppose player i sponsors an arc with a player k 6∈ X, then i has sponsored all
the arcs in which she is involved by Lemma 2 (a).
Suppose now that player i is linked only to players in X. To introduce a contradiction, suppose
i does not sponsor all her arcs. Then there are three distinct players, say j, j1 and j2 in X,
such that ij, ij1, ij2 ∈ A(g), where at least one of these arcs is not sponsored by player i.
Without loss of generality we assume that j i ∈ A(g). Since g is a strict Nash network, and
hence a base network either j j1 6∈ A(g), or j j2 6∈ A(g). Wlog we assume that j j1 6∈ A(g). We
will show that player j has an incentive to replace the arc j i by the arc j j1. Let g
′ be the
network such that A(g′) = A(g) + j j1 − j i.
First, we show that NCj (A(g)) ⊂ NCj (A(g′)). To establish this result, (i) we first show that if
k ∈ NCj (A(g)) \NCj (A(g′)), then there is an u-path between j and k which does not contain
any player j′ ∈ Vi(g) \ {j}. (ii) Then, we establish that in this case, there are two disjoint
u-paths between j and k in g′ which contradicts the assumption concerning the existence of a
player k who belongs to NCj (A(g)) \NCj (A(g′)).
(i) Suppose k ∈ NCj (A(g)) \NCj (A(g′)). Then, the resources of k are confirmed in g by player
j due to an u-path, say P 1j,k(g), which contains player i. This u-path also contains a player,
say j′1 ∈ Vi(g) \ {j}. We establish that there is an u-path between j and k in g disjoint
from P 1j,k(g), say P
2
j,k(g), which does not contain any player j
′ ∈ Vi(g) \ {j}. To introduce a
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contradiction, suppose that such an u-path does not exist, that is P 2j,k(g) contains a player,
say j2 ∈ Vi(g) \ {j, j′1}. In this situation, players i, j′1, k, j2, and j belong to a cycle in g. It
follows that player i (or player j2) has no incentive to maintain the arc ij2 (or the arc j2 i) in
g and g is not a strict Nash network, a contradiction.
To sum up, we know that (a) there is an u-path P 2j,k(g) which does not contain any player
j′ ∈ Vi(g) \ {j}, (b) the u-path P 1j,k(g) contains player i, and (c) P 1j,k(g) and P 2j,k(g) are
disjoint.
(ii) We now show that there are two disjoint u-paths between j and k in g′. There are
two cases: either P 1j,k(g) contains player j1, or P
1
j,k(g) does not contain player j1. If P
1
j,k(g)
contains player j1: P
1
j,k(g) = j, i, j1, . . . , k in g with ji ∈ A(g), then there is an u-path between
j and k in g′: P 1j,k(g
′) = j, j1, . . . , k in g′, with jj1 ∈ A(g). Clearly, P 1j,k(g′) and P 2j,k(g) are
disjoint, so k ∈ NCj (g′), that is k /∈ NCj (g) \ NCj (g′): a contradiction. If P 1j,k(g) does not
contain player j1, then it contains a player, say j2, in Vi(g): P
1
j,k(g) = j, i, j2, . . . , k in g with
ji ∈ A(g). In this case, there is an u-path between k and j in g′: P 1′j,k(g′) = j, j1, i, j2 . . . , k
with jj1 ∈ A(g′). P 1′j,k(g′) and P 2j,k(g) are disjoint since j2 ∈ Vi(g), and so j2 6∈ P 2j,k(g).
Consequently, k ∈ NCj (A(g′)), that is k /∈ NCj (g) \NCj (g′): a contradiction.
Second, since ij1 ∈ A(g) ∩A(g′), we have NUj (A(g)) ⊂ NUj (A(g′)).
Third, as the costs of each arc are the same, this implies that j is indifferent between sponsoring
ji and jj1. Since N
C
j (A(g)) ⊂ NCj (A(g′)), it follows that player j does not play a strict best
response in g. This concludes the proof. 
Lemma 4 Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 1 and g is a non-empty strict
Nash network. No player i in a MECS X forms an arc with a player j 6∈ X.
Proof Let g be a non-empty strict Nash network which contains a MECS X. To introduce
a contradiction suppose that a key player i ∈ X is linked with j 6∈ X. Since i belongs to a
MECS, there exist i1 and i2 such that ii1, i2 i1 ∈ A(g). By Lemma 2, Vj(g) = {i}, ij ∈ A(g)
and ii1 ∈ A(g). Let K be the number of resources of unconfirmed players that each player
who belongs to X obtains in g. Since g is a strict Nash network player j has no incentive to
form an arc with player i1. It follows that
pij(A(g)) = f1(0)+f2(|X|+K−1)−f3(0) > f1(|X|)+f2(K−1)−f3(1) = pij(A(g)+j i1) (10)
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There are two cases: either i1i2 ∈ A(g), or i2i1 ∈ A(g). We deal successively with the two
possibilities.
1. Suppose i1 i2 ∈ A(g). Player i1 cannot sponsor more than one arc otherwise she is a key
player and she cannot receive an arc from player i by Lemma 3.
Since g is a strict Nash network, player i1 has no incentive to remove her arc. We have:
pii1(A(g)) = f1(|X|−1)+f2(K)−f3(1) > f1(0)+f2(|X|+K−1)−f3(0) = pij(A(g)−i1 i2).
(11)
Due to A1, inequalities 10 and 11 are not compatible, a contradiction.
2. Suppose i2i1 ∈ A(g). Since player i1 is not a key player |Vi1(g)| = 2. We have Vi1(g) =
{i, i2}, and
pii2(A(g)) = f1(|X| − 1) + f2(K)− f3(|Ai2(g)|) = pii2(A(g)− i2 i1 + i2j). (12)
Consequently, player i2 does not play a strict best response and g is not a strict Nash
network, a contradiction.

Lemma 5 Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 1 and g is a non-empty strict
Nash network. Then, g is either connected, or it contains wheels and a sub-network g|N\W
where g|N\W is either empty, or connected.
Proof Let g be a non-empty strict Nash network.
1. First, we consider situations where g does not contain a wheel. To introduce a contra-
diction suppose that g is not connected. There are two situations, (i) either g contains
no cycle, or (ii) g contains a cycle (which is not a wheel).
(i) Suppose g contains no cycle. Since g is non-empty, there are two players i and j
such that ij ∈ A(g). Since g is not connected, there are players ` ∈ N \ {i} such that
` /∈ NUi (A(g)). Either (i.a) |A`(g)| = 0 for all ` /∈ NUi (A(g)), or (i.b) there exists a player
` /∈ NUi (A(g)) such that |A`(g)| > 0.
(i.a) Suppose |A`(g)| = 0 for all ` /∈ NUi (A(g)), that is, players ` /∈ NUi (A(g)) are iso-
lated players in g. Then there are two cases: pii(Ai(g), A−i(g)) ≤ pi`(A`(g), A−`(g)) or
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pii(Ai(g), A−i(g)) ≥ pi`(A`(g), A−`(g)). In the first case, player i has an incentive to
remove all her arcs and g is not a strict Nash network. In the second case, let net-
work g′ be such that A`(g′) = {`i} and Aj(g′) = Aj(g) for all j ∈ N \ {`}. We have
pi`(A(g
′)) = f1(0) + f2(|NUi (A(g)) + 1|) − f3(1) > f1(0) + f2(|NUi (A(g))|) − f3(1) ≥
f1(0) + f2(|NUi (A(g))|)) − f3(|(Ai(g)|) = pii(A(g)) ≥ pi`(A(g)). Consequently, player `
does not play a strict best response and g is not a strict Nash network.
(i.b) Suppose there is a player ` /∈ NUi (A(g)) such that |A`(g)| > 0. Since g contains
no cycle there exists a player i′, with i ∈ NUi′ (g), and a player `′, with ` ∈ N`′(g), who
receive no arcs in g. In the following we deal with players i′ and `′. Wlog suppose that
pii′(Ai′(g), A−i′(g)) ≥ pi`′(A`′(g), A−`′(g)). By the same reasoning as in the second case
of point (i.a) above, we can check that player `′ does not play a strict best response and
g is not a strict Nash network.
(ii) Suppose g contains a cycle (which is not a wheel). Since there is a cycle, there
is a MECS, say X. Moreover, since g contains no wheel, the considered cycle con-
tains a player, say i, who has formed arcs with at least two players. By Lemma 3, i
receives no arcs. Since g is not connected there is a player ` ∈ N \ {i} such that i
and ` are not connected in g. Either (ii.a) |A`(g)| = 0 for all ` /∈ Ni(A(g)), where
Ni(A(g)) = N
U
i (A(g)) ∪NCi (A(g)), or (ii.b) there exist players ` /∈ Ni(A(g)) such that
|A`(g)| > 0.
(ii.a) |A`(g)| = 0 for all ` /∈ Ni(A(g)). By the same type of reasoning as in point (i.a)
above we can check that player i or each player ` /∈ Ni(A(g)) do not play a strict best
response and g is not a strict Nash network.
(ii.b) Suppose there exist players ` /∈ Ni(A(g)) such that |A`(g)| > 0.
Suppose that there exist players ` /∈ Ni(A(g)) such that |A`(g)| > 0 who belong to a
cycle. We consider a player ` who is not connected with i in g, who belongs to a cy-
cle and who has formed arcs with at least two players. Note that ` receives no arcs
by Lemma 3. Suppose wlog that pii(A(g)) ≥ pi`(A(g)). Let g′′ be the network such
that A`(g
′′) = Ai(g) and Aj(g′′) = Aj(g) for all j ∈ N \ {`}. We have pi`(A(g′′)) =
f1(|NCi (A(g))|+ 1) +f2(|NUi (A(g))|)−f3(|Ai(g)|) > f1(|NCi (A(g))|) +f2(|NUi (A(g))|)−
f3(|Ai(g)|) = pii(A(g)) ≥ pi`(A(g)), hence player ` does not play a strict best response,
and g is not a strict Nash network.
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Suppose that no player `, ` /∈ Ni(A(g)) and` /∈ Ni(A(g)) and |A`(g)| > 0 |A`(g)| > 0,
belongs to a cycle. We consider player ` /∈ Ni(A(g)) with |A`(g)| > 0. If pii(A(g)) ≥
pi`(A(g)), then by the same reasoning as in the case (ii.b.1), we can check that player `
does not play a strict best response and g is not a strict Nash network. If pii(A(g)) ≤
pi`(A(g)), then by the same reasoning as in the second case of point (i.a) above, we can
check that player i does not play a strict best response and g is not a strict Nash network.
2. Second, consider situations where g contains wheels. In such a case, we focus on g|N\W .
More precisely, we use the same arguments as in the previous point to obtain the result.
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Proof of Proposition 4. Let g be a connected strict Nash network. By Lemma 2 and 4
either (1) g contains a MECS, say X, and all players belong to X, or (2) g does not contain
any MECS. We deal successively with these two cases.
1. Suppose g contains a MECS, say X and all players belong to X. We show that g, which
is a confirmed network, is a minimal confirmed network where all key players are the
sponsors of all arcs they are involved in. Suppose g is a confirmed network which is not
a minimal confirmed network. Then, there is a costly arc which can be deleted such that
the resulting network is still confirmed. This implies that the sponsor of the arc is better
off deleting the arc, hence g is not a strict Nash network, a contradiction. Finally, by
Lemma 3, we know that in a minimally confirmed strict Nash network, all key players
are the sponsors of all arcs they are involved in.
2. The proof given here is inspired by the proof given by Bala and Goyal (Proposition 4.2,
pg. 1204, [2]). Suppose g does not contain any MECS. It follows that g contains no
cycle. Since g is connected, it is minimally unconfirmed. Moreover, if ij ∈ A(g), then
there is no player k such that ki ∈ A(g) (or kj ∈ A(g)), since k can replace the arc ki
by kj (kj by ki) and obtains the same payoff as in g. It follows that if j i ∈ A(g), then j
has formed arcs with all players in Vj(A(g)). Moreover, no player, except j can form arcs
with players in Vj(A(g)). Consequently, player j forms arcs with all players in N \ {j}
in g since this network is minimally unconfirmed. It follows that g is a center sponsored
star.

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Proof of Proposition 5. Let g be a non-empty and non-connected strict Nash network.
We know by Lemma 5 that there is a unique sub-network, g|N\W , which is either empty, or
connected. By using the same arguments as in Proposition 4 we obtain the result: g|N\W is
empty, or a center sponsored star, or a minimally confirmed network. We now show that g|N\W
is not a center sponsored star. To introduce a contradiction, suppose a strict Nash network g
which contains both a wheel g|W , with W (g) ⊂ W(g) and a center sponsored star g|N\W . Let
i ∈ N \ W(g) be the player who forms arcs in g|N\W , let j ∈ N \ (W(g) ∪ {i}) be a player
in the center sponsored star and let ` ∈ W . By construction, |W (g)| ≥ 3. Finally, we set
A(g′) = A(g)− ij+ i`. We have pii(A(g)) = f1(0) + f2(|N \W(g)| − 1)− f3(|N \W(g)| − 1) <
f1(0) + f2(|N \ W(g)| − 2 + |W (g)|)− f3(|N \ W(g)| − 1) = pii(A(g′)). The inequality comes
from the strict increasing property of f2. It follows that player i does not play a strict best
response and g is not a strict Nash network, a contradiction.

Appendix C. Heterogenous players: Journalists
Proof of Proposition 9. We prove successively the different parts of the proposition.
1. We first show that g will contain exactly one MECS. Suppose not, then either g contains
zero MECS or at least two MECS. If g contains zero MECS, then g would be minimally
unconfirmed connected. By standard arguments (see the proof of Proposition 4), g would
be a center sponsored star, gCSS . Let k be the central player of gCSS . Clearly k has to
be an ordinary player, and earns payoff f2 (n− 1) − f3 (n− 1) > 0. However, as |J | > 0,
there is a journalist among the peripheral players, who could earn f1 (n− 1) − f3 (n− 2) by
sponsoring an arc to each of the other peripheral players. Since f3 (n− 2) < f3 (n− 1), and
f1 (n− 1) > f2 (n− 1) by (A1) and f1(0) = f2(0), we obtain a contradiction.
Now suppose that g contains more than one MECS. W.l.o.g. let X and X ′ be two distinct
MECS of g. Note that Lemma’s 1-3 also apply in the model with journalists as all the
arguments in these lemmas are about switching arcs, rather than about the willingness to add
or maintain arcs. By Lemma 1, no player is part of multiple MECS. Moreover, by Lemma 2
if any player i in an MECS X is connected to some player j /∈ X, then Vj (g) = {i}. These
two observations combined imply that no player i in MECS X can be connected to any player
j′ ∈ X ′. By the connectedness of g, it cannot contain more than one MECS.
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Now we show the remainder of part 1. Let g be a connected strict Nash network. Suppose
that there exists a player j ∈ N\X. By Lemma 2, there exists i ∈ X such that Vj (g) = {i},
and ij ∈ A(g). Clearly, i would strictly prefer to delete ij if i ∈ J . Thus i /∈ J . Now we prove
that j /∈ J . Following the proof of Lemma 4, there exist i1, i2 ∈ X such that ii1, i1 i2 ∈ A(g).
Moreover player i1 sponsors exactly one arc. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that j ∈ J .
Then j would gain f1 (|X|) at the cost of a single arc by sponsoring j i1, whereas i1 gains at
most f1 (|X − 1|) by his single arc. Thus we obtain our contradiction: either i1 would strictly
prefer to delete i1 i2, or j would prefer to add j i1 neither of that is consistent with g being a
strict Nash network.
2. We first show that if g is non-empty and non-connected, then all arcs are part of a cycle.
Consider the following two observations. First in any strict Nash network g, a player who
sponsors an arc that is not part of a cycle, does so to gain the maximal number of additional
connections. Second, any arc which is not part of a cycle will result in exactly one additional
unconfirmed connection, otherwise the sponsor would be indifferent regarding the recipient of
the arc. The second observation implies that if ij ∈ A(g) and ij does not belong to a cycle
then Vj(g) = {i}. In that case player i (weakly) prefers to replace her arc ij by an arc ij′,
with j′ 6∈ Ni(g). It follows that if a non-connected network g contains an arc which is not part
of a cycle, then g must be connected, a contradiction.
Note that, by Lemma 1, this implies that all components are MECS. Lemma 5 tells us that
if any players in g are isolated, then all non-empty components must be wheels, as isolated
journalists will have no more incentives to sponsor two arcs to some non-empty component
than isolated ordinary players. Finally, if no players are isolated in g, then no two components
(both MECS) can have a player who sponsors at least two arcs. Suppose not. Then there exist
two components X and X ′ and two players i ∈ X and i′ ∈ X ′ such that i and i′ sponsor at
least two arcs each. W.l.o.g. let |X| ≥ |X ′| . Then i′ gains confirmed access to at most |X ′|−1
players by sponsoring at least two arcs. Therefore i′ would strictly improve his payoffs if he
would replace all his current arcs in g by arcs to two players in X, as he would get confirmed
access to |X| > |X ′| − 1 players at the cost of only two arcs. Thus, if no players are isolated,
then at most one component in g is not a wheel. 
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Appendix D. Strict bilaterally rational networks
The proof of the next lemma is an adaptation of the proof given by Bala and Goyal ([2],
Proposition 4.2, pg 1204).
Lemma 6 Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 1 and g is a non-empty strict
bilaterally rational network. Suppose g|X is an acyclic connected component of g. Then, g|X
is a center sponsored star.
Proof Let g be a non-empty strict bilaterally rational network and let g|X be an acyclic
connected component of g. Since g is a strict bilaterally rational network, it is a strict Nash
network. Consequently, g|X is minimally unconfirmed. To introduce a contradiction, suppose
that g|X is not a center sponsored star and that player i has formed an arc with player j in
this network. No player ` ∈ X forms an arc with player j or player i in g, otherwise player `
can replace her arc `j (or `i) by the arc `i (respectively `j) and all players obtain the same
payoff as in g. Consequently, g is not a strict bilaterally rational network, a contradiction. 
Lemma 7 Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 1 and g is a non-empty
bilaterally rational network. Then, g is connected.
Proof Let g be a non-empty bilaterally rational network. To introduce a contradiction,
suppose that g is not connected.
First, suppose that g is acyclic. By Lemma 6, there exist two players, say i and j such that
ij ∈ A(g) and Vj(g) = {i}. Suppose that player ` is not connected with player i in g. Let g′
be the network where player i replaces the arc ij by the arc i`, that is A(g′) = A(g) + i`− ij.
We have: pii(A(g)) ≤ pii(A(g′)) and pi`(A(g)) < pi`(A(g′)), the former inequality comes from
the fact that player ` can be a non-isolated player. Consequently, g is not a bilaterally rational
network, a contradiction.
Second, suppose that g contains a MECS, say X1(g), such that players i and j are members
of X1(g) and ij ∈ A(g). Since g is not connected, there exists a player ` who does not obtain
any resources from player i. We show that player ` is not an isolated player. Indeed, if ` is an
isolated player, then we have either pi`(A(g)) ≥ pii(A(g)), or pi`(A(g)) < pii(A(g)). Suppose
pi`(A(g)) ≥ pii(A(g)). Then, g is not a strict Nash network, and so it is not a bilaterally
rational network, since player i should remove all her arcs to improve her payoff. Suppose
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pi`(A(g)) < pii(A(g)). Let g
′ be the network such that A(g′) = A(g) + i` + `j − ij. In g′
player i obtains a higher payoff than in g since she obtains an additional confirmed resource.
Moreover, we have pi`(A(g
′)) ≥ pii(A(g′)) > pii(A(g)) > pi`(A(g)), and g is not a bilaterally
rational network.
Since ` is not an isolated player, (i) either player ` belongs to a MECS, (ii) or she belongs
to an acyclic component. (i) Suppose player ` belongs to a MECS, say X2(g). Then there
exist two players in X2(g), say i
′ and j′ such that i′j′ ∈ A(g). We consider the network
g′ such that A(g′) = A(g) + ij′ + i′j − ij − i′j′. In g′, players i and i′ obtain confirmed
resources from all players who belong to X1(g) ∪ X2(g) and incur the same costs as in g.
Consequently, we have: pii(A(g
′)) − pii(A(g)) ≥ f1(|X1(g)| + |X2(g)|) − f1(|X1(g)|) > 0 and
pii′(A(g
′)) − pii′(A(g)) ≥ f1(|X1(g)| + |X2(g)|) − f1(|X2(g)|) > 0. The inequalities come
from the fact that f1 is increasing. Consequently, g is not a bilaterally rational network, a
contradiction. (ii) Suppose player ` belongs to an acyclic component. Then by Lemma 6,
player ` belongs to a center sponsored star. We consider the player who sponsors the arcs
in this center sponsored star, say `0. This player has formed an arc in g with a player, say
`1, such that V`1 = {`0}. Since f2 is an increasing function and a MECS contains at least
three players, we have: pi`(A(g) + `0 i− `0`1) > pi`(A(g)). Consequently, g is not a bilaterally
rational network, a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 10. Let g be a non-empty bilaterally rational network. By Lemma
7, g is connected. Since g is a bilaterally rational network, it is a strict Nash network.
Consequently, by Proposition 4 only minimally confirmed networks, where all key players are
the sponsors of all arcs they are involved in, and center sponsored stars are candidates to be
bilaterally rational networks. 
Since a strict bilaterally rational network is a strict Nash network, Lemmas 4 and 5 are
satisfied for strict bilaterally rational networks. Hence we have Lemmas 8 and 9.
Lemma 8 Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 1 and g is a strict bilaterally
rational network. Let X be a MECS of g. If i ∈ X and i is a key player, then i is the sponsor
of all arcs she is involved in.
Lemma 9 Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 1 and g is a non-empty strict
bilaterally rational network. No player i in a MECS X forms an arc with a player j 6∈ X.
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Lemma 10 Suppose that the payoff function is given by equation 1 and g is a minimally
confirmed strict bilaterally rational network which is not a minimal cycle. Then g is a complete
bipartite network which contains two key players who are linked with at least three non key
players.
Proof Let g be a minimally confirmed strict bilaterally rational network which is not a
minimal cycle.
1. We show that there are at least two key players in g. Since g is not a minimal cycle, there
exists a player, say i0, who is involved in 3 arcs in g. By Lemma 8, i0 sponsors all these arcs.
We now show that there exists another player, say j0, who is involved in 3 arcs in g. Let
{i1, i2, i3} ⊂ Vi0 . Since g is a minimally confirmed network, there exist two disjoint u-paths
between i1 and i2: P
1
i1i2
(g) = i1, i0, i2 with i0i1, i0i2 ∈ A(g) and P 2i1i2(g). Likewise there exist
two disjoint u-paths between i1 and i3: P
1
i1i3
(g) = i1, i0, i3 with i0i1, i0i3 ∈ A(g) and P 2i1i3(g).
There always exists a player, say j0 ∈ N \ {i1}, who belongs simultaneously to P 2i1i2(g) and
P 2i1i3(g) otherwise player i0 obtains confirmed resources from i1 through i2 and i3 and g is not
a minimally confirmed network (the arc i0i1 is not needed). Likewise, it is worth noting that
j0 6∈ {i2, i3} otherwise g is not a minimally confirmed network. It follows that j0 is involved
in 3 arcs: an arc which linked two players who belong to a u-path between i1 and j0, an arc
which linked two players who belong to a u-path between i2 and j0, and an arc which linked
two players who belong to a u-path between i3 and j0. By Lemma 8, player j0 sponsors all
her arcs in g.
2. We show that key players sponsor arcs with the same players. To introduce a contradiction,
suppose that key players i0 and j0 do not sponsor arcs with the same players. Since g is
a minimally confirmed network, there exists an u-path between i0 and j0, say Pi0,j0(g) =
i0, j1, . . . , jm−1, jm, j0 where j1 6= jm. Suppose players i0 and j0 modify their strategies:
player i0 replaces the arc i0j1 by i0jm and player j0 replaces the arc j0jm by j0j1. Then, we
obtain the network g′ such that A(g′) = A(g) + i0jm − i0j1 + j0j1 − j0jm. Players i0 and j0
obtain the same payoff in g and in g′: they obtain the same resources and incur the same costs
in g′ and in g. Consequently, g is not a strict bilaterally rational network, a contradiction.
3. We show that each key player sponsors links with all non key players. Let i and k be key
players and let j be a non key player. Players i and k are both confirmed connected to non-key
player j, so i and k both have two disjoint u-paths to player j. Consequently, there is a u-path
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between i and k on which j lies. By Lemma 3, i and k sponsor the first link on the u-paths
connecting them to j. By Part 2, this means that the only other player on this path is player
j.
4. We show that there are no links between non key players in g. Indeed, since there are
at least two key players in g, and each of them are linked to all non key players, the latter
receives at least 2 links and cannot be involved in more links.
5. We show that there are 2 key players and at least 3 non key players in g. First, since key
players have formed at least 3 links, and cannot be linked, it follows that there are at least 3
non key players in g. Second, we know from point 3. that each non key player receives a link
from each key player. Since a non key player is involved in at most 2 links, there are at most
2 key players. By point 1 it follows that there are 2 key players. 
Proof of Proposition 11. Let g be a non-empty strict bilaterally rational network. By
Lemma 7, g is connected. Suppose g is acyclic. Then, by Lemma 6, it is a center sponsored
star. Suppose that g contains a cycle. Then, Lemma 10 establishes that if g is not a minimal
cycle, then it is a complete bipartite network containing two key players who are linked with
at least three non key players. 
In the following, we call the framework, where each player i confirm resources from player
j when she is directly linked with j in addition to the the case where there exist at least two
u-path between i and j, the direct link confirmation framework (DLCF). We show that the
results of our original framework and the DLCF are identical regarding strict Nash networks.
Appendix E. The Direct Link Confirmation Model: Sketch of
proofs
The main difference between the framework adopted in the paper and the DLCF model is that
we now have to replace the notion of MECS with cycles. Consequently to establish that the
results are the same in the two models, we first deal with results concerning cycles. Thus, in
all the following proofs we have to replace MECS by cycles.
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Lemma 1’.
In DLCF, Lemma 1 should state that it is not possible that there exists a player i who belongs
simultaneously to two distinct maximal (relative to the vertices) cycles. By using similar ar-
guments as those given in Lemma 1, we obtain the required result.
Lemma 2’.
Lemma 2 can be adapted in the DLCF:
(a) no player j who belongs to a cycle will sponsor an arc with a player i in the cycle who has
sponsored an arc with a player i′ who does not belong to the cycle. Indeed, player j would
have an incentive to replace her arc with i by an arc with i′;
(b) no player i′ who does not belong to a cycle sponsors an arc with player i who belongs to a
cycle. Indeed, the argument given in Lemma 2 is preserved: The payoff of i′ does not change
if she replaces her current arc with i in the cycle by an arc with another player of the cycle
say j;
(c) player i′, who does not belong to a cycle and is directly linked with a player i who belongs
to the cycle, has no other direct neighbor j′, otherwise player i could replace her arc with i′
by an arc with j′.
Lemma 3’.
We have to show that in the DLCF, a key player sponsors all the arcs she is involved in.
By Lemma 2, we know that player i who belongs to a cycle sponsors arcs with players who do
not belong to the cycle. Arguments which show that a key player sponsors arc with players
who belong to the cycle in the DLCF are the same as in our original framework: If a player j
has formed a link with a key player, then she can replace this link by a link with a neighbor
of the key player without reducing her payoff.
Lemma 4’.
Assume that players i, j, i1 , i2 are in the same position as in the original Lemma 4. We have
to show that a player in a cycle does not sponsor an arc with a player who does not belong to
this cycle. Let K be the number of unconfirmed resources obtained by player i1. Recall that
i1 cannot be a key player in Lemma 4. Hence she is involved only in the two links with i and
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i2. This is true in the DLCF.
In the proof of Lemma 4, equation 10 becomes:
pij(A(g)) = f1(1) + f2(|X|+K − 2)− f3(0)
> f1(|X|) + f2(K − 1)− f3(1)
= pij(A(g) + ji1).
Let us examine the two possibilities given in the proof of Lemma 4.
• Assume i1i2 ∈ A(g). Equation 11 becomes:
pii1(A(g)) = f1(|X| − 1) + f2(K)− f3(1)
> f1(1) + f2(|X|+K − 2)− f3(0)
= pii1(A(g)− i1i2).
We obtain a contraction as in the original framework.
• Assume i2i1 ∈ A(g). Equation 12 becomes:
pii2(A(g)) = f1(|Vi2(g) \X|+ |X| − 1) + f2(K − |Vi2(g) \X|)
−f3(|Ai2(g)|)
= pii2(A(g)− i2i1 + i2j).
We obtain a contraction as in the original framework.
Lemma 5’.
Lemma 5 is not altered by the assumptions of DLCF.
To sum up, the assumption that the confirmation can happen when two players are directly
linked does not change the fact that non-acyclic components in a strict Nash network are
cycles. The properties of these cycles are not altered by the fact that the confirmation can
happen when two players are directly linked.
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